Missteps that led to taming of KDMs

Raymond Tombung

The late Sabah chief minister Fuad (Donald) Stephens while a visionary had underestimated the seeds of Malay supremacy taking root in Sabah in the 1970s.

Once upon a time the Kadazandusun and Muruts (KDMs) of Sabah had a powerful vision. They saw a new world, a bright future in which they would be the political kingmakers and the architects of their destiny.

Fuad (Donald) Stephens had this vision in the pre-independence days of the 1950s. He saw the raw qualities of the North Borneo societies as potential ingredients for a future political formula in which the natives will become self-reliant and independent.

Stephens saw the rich heritage of the KDMs and that with the injection of external inputs of knowledge and skills, and the support of the Chinese, this “body of heritage” would be solidified into a powerful force.

He felt that this powerful force would transform North Borneo into a rich and stable nation.

But many missteps dealt deadly blows to this vision. The mission went awry.

Stephens’ first mistake was to condemn the term “Dusun” as a derogatory name suited only for gullible country yokels.

In his eagerness to unite his people he underestimated the Dusun pride. To his utter astonishment, all the arguments for Kadazanism didn’t work.

Instead, they triggered the rise of Dusunism and Murutism, two nationalistic spirits that morphed into Pasok Momogun whose influence then swept throughout the land from Kudat, Bandau, Kota Belud, Ranau, Tambunan to the interiors which covered Keningau and Tenom.

Umno’s long reach

The blows against Stephens’ United National Kadazan Organisation (Unko), whose support centred in the Kadazan areas of Penampang and Papar, were strong and unstoppable.

It forced Stephens to go to Bingkor, with his large delegation, putting up for a night at the Rumah Besar, to offer reconciliation to the Gunsanad brothers – Sedomon and Sundang – hence the combination of Unko and Pasok Momogun to form “Upko”.

Stephens’ second misstep was to ignore Tun Mustapha Harun’s offer of political collaboration under one party.

The confidence with Unko, and later Upko, was understandable given the political climate of the time.

Stephens had underestimated the seeds of Malay supremacy which had began to take root.

The long hand of Umno-Kuala Lumpur inevitably intervened, manifesting in the mission of Syed Kechik Syed Mohamad to Sabah, to ensure the ascendancy of Mustapha to power.

But when Parti Bersatu Sabah (PBS) made a pact with Usno in 1985, it made the same error. PBS abandoned its pact, sending Mustapha into political wilderness.

It was in part a supposed payback for what was done to Stephens after the 1967 general election.
But you reap what you sow; the cycle of rewards and retributions tends to return past scores in equal measures.

Balance of power

However, there is agreement on one point: the KDMs then had a fighting spirit, and the willingness to take risks for the sake of a vision.

But due to deadly blows sustained in a series of political repercussions, KDMs now seem to have lost most of this spirit.

Tamed to a corner, KDM parties in BN see this as the age of compromise, of co-operation, of give and take, of “constructive engagements”.

This conciliatory gesture is claimed to be a mark of strategic wisdom, but it should only be pursued for as long as it does not obliterate the vision for a better future.

Many KDM leaders in BN rationalise that the current political balance of power makes combative political approach unwise.

But that in itself is a miscalculation of what determined Malaysians can do to transform the nation.

To relent and say, “What else can we do?” shows the defeatist attitude of KDM and a glaring lack of political creativity.

With that stance, there is no more vision. Without vision, the future is dead.

“Where there is no vision, there is no hope,” said George Washington Carver , and indeed without a vision, the KDMs are dead!